Introduction
Some readers have taken Hobbes's analogy between individuals and states all too literally. For Hannah Arendt, the restless desire for power after power that he posits in Leviathan also applies to commonwealths, which supposedly need to constantly extend their authority simply in order to preserve themselves. 1 Other commentators associate Hobbes with the so-called 'Westphalian system' of mutually recognised sovereign states. Carl Schmitt, for instance, claims that Hobbesian states are 'moral persons' that confront each other with equal rights and legitimacy. 2 It is widely agreed that both of these readings are inaccurate. There seem to be important differences between the international and interpersonal states of nature, some of which relate to the fact that Hobbes regards commonwealths as artefacts created for the preservation of individuals. 3 Thus, there must be limits to the hostility between states. 4 Moreover, Hobbes does not appear to regard states as compound moral persons that have a capacity to have one will, irrespective of the people who institute or represent them. 5 Rather, commonwealths only exist as long as they are effectively represented by a sovereign, and it is in the latter's self-interest to govern in such a way that does not endanger his position of power. 6 This article seeks to contribute to a better understanding of Hobbes's international political thought by focussing on the notions of nature and artifice. It aims to clarify in which sense the international state of war can be regarded as natural, and how the artificiality of states bears upon their naturally hostile relations.
The thesis is that, despite the fact that Hobbesian commonwealths find themselves in a state of nature, their artificiality facilitates coexistence, self-restraint in warfare, and reconciliation. In particular, it will be suggested that states could maintain largely peaceful relations based on an artificial equality of power, which has a contrary effect to the natural equality of individuals in the state of nature. Moreover, it will be shown that states could be decomposed and reassembled in order to re-establish peace after foreign invasions. These factors help to explain both why Hobbes considers the international state of nature more bearable than the interpersonal one, and why he does not seem to provide a separate theory of international relations. 4 Stanley Hoffmann suggests that every Hobbesian state has a domestic interest in self-restraint, "since, should it implicate its population in all-out wars of extermination, the duty of obedience of the subjects to the state would disappear." See Hoffmann, "Rousseau on War and Peace", American Political Science Review 57 (1963) , pp. 317-333, here 320. 
I. Individuals and Groups as Enemies by Nature
Rejecting the idea of natural sociability, Hobbes posits a state of nature in which human beings are defined by their natural faculties, including an equal capacity to kill and get killed. He argues that the war of all against all that would materialise in this condition is avoidable if we follow the laws of nature, which set out how peace can be achieved within a rationally constructed, artificial political order.
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From this brief outline of Hobbes's argument two implications can be drawn out.
First, enmity is 'natural' in the sense that it is due to unchanging human characteristics, such as the desire for self-preservation, yet despite this it is not unavoidable. To the contrary, the natural law prescribes "that every man ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it." 10 While Hobbes suggests that it is not required to grant peace to those individuals who remain in a hostile frame of 7 The following editions will be used: Thomas Hobbes, In addition, he suggests that there may be a shift of identities:
[T]he Romans, when they had subdued many nations, to make their government digestible were wont to take away that grievance as much as they thought necessary by giving, sometimes to whole nations and sometimes to principal man of every nation they conquered, not only the privileges but also the name of Romans.
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Notwithstanding such considerations, Hobbes generally prefers an explicitly political conception of group identity, which reflects his conception of the state as a work of admits that, despite the Act of Union, England and Scotland were not fully integrated at the time. Yet he insists that, being subject to the same sovereign, "they were mistaken, both English and Scots, in calling one another foreigners." 22 Hobbes's views on enmity can be contrasted with those of Plato. In Book V of the Republic, Plato criticises Greeks who ravage each other's lands and enslave all inhabitants of a city. 23 Plato apparently regards such behaviour as appropriate in wars between Greeks and barbarians, who are 'natural enemies.' Yet he believes that, among themselves, Greeks "will quarrel with the aim of being reconciled." 24 By contrast, Hobbes holds that natural hostility is due to universal human characteristics, and seems to be of the view that enemies can be reconciled under the government of an absolute ruler regardless of their pre-existing social bonds and identities.
II. The Representation and Dissolution of States
It is well known that Hobbes's social contract theory conceives of the constitution of the state in terms of a transfer of right, whereby everyone is supposed to submit their strength and resources to a number of people. In doing so, they "appoint one man or assembly of men to bear their person, and every one to own and acknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever he that so beareth their person shall act, or cause to be acted," as Hobbes puts it in Leviathan. 25 The artificial personality of the state, and to what extent it is distinct from the person of the sovereign, has been much debated. [W]hen in a war [...] the enemies get a final victory, so as (the forces of the commonwealth keeping the field no longer), there is no farther protection in their loyalty, then is the commonwealth DISSOLVED, and every man at liberty to protect himself by such courses as his own discretion shall suggest to him.
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As was previously mentioned, this liberty allows individuals to submit themselves to a foreign ruler, who thus acquires sovereignty by conquest.
Given that the victor essentially needs to establish a relationship of mutual trust with the vanquished in order to acquire sovereignty, 40 the sovereign requires particular protection in times of war is further suggested by a passage in Leviathan, according to which every subject ought "to protect in war the authority by which he is himself protected in time of peace." 45 The picture emerging from these passages is that, on the one hand, rulers recognise each other's sovereignty and maintain diplomatic relations. On the other hand, sovereigns may be specifically targeted at war, ultimately serving as disposable figureheads. Far from implicating the annihilation of the civilian population, the 'violent death' of the state, therefore, prepares the ground for reconciliation, i.e., it allows former subjects to submit themselves to a new sovereign.
III. Artificial Equality as a Source of Security
So far it has been shown that natural enmity, for Hobbes, does not preclude reconciliation. The latter is facilitated by the fact that states can be decomposed and reassembled in the aftermath of foreign invasions. As will be further demonstrated in this section, Hobbesian commonwealths may also coexist peacefully for considerable amounts of time due to what may be called their artificial equality.
A characteristic feature of the interpersonal state of nature is that "the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest." 46 In other words, human beings are roughly equal in their capacity to kill and get killed, which is one of the reasons why a war of all against all would, according to Hobbes, materialise in this condition. Interpreters have noted that this assumption does not hold true in international relations, since 45 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 490. 46 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 74. there are differences in power between states. 47 It has also been suggested that Hobbesian commonwealths would have an incentive to create an imbalance of power by forming defensive leagues. 48 However, there are reasons to believe that some kind of equality between states might actually have beneficial effects, a possibility that has, to my knowledge, not been considered in the literature on Hobbes.
To begin with, it seems clear that international relations and the state of nature are not meant to be identical in all respects. One difference, which Hobbes acknowledges in
On the Citizen, is that there can be times of international peace:
[T]hose who have not grown together into unity of person are, as shown above at v.6, in a state of enmity with each other. Never mind that they are not always fighting (for enemies too make truces); hostility is adequately shown by distrust, and by the fact that the borders of their commonwealths, Kingdoms and empires, armed and garrisoned, with the posture and appearance of gladiators, look across at each other like enemies, even when they are not striking each other. aggression by foreign enemies, which would undermine the security of a newly formed state. 54 In Leviathan, he puts this point as follows:
The multitude sufficient to confide in or our security is not determined by any certain number, but by comparison with the enemy we fear, and is then sufficient, when the odds of the enemy is not of so visible and conspicuous moment, to determine the event of war, as to move him to attempt. 55 As an additional requirement of state formation, Hobbes emphasises throughout his writings that the people's force and resources must be truly united by an absolute sovereign. In Leviathan, he thus points out that a large but divided commonwealth is "easily […] subdued by a very few that agree together." . 57 Hobbes does not deny that commonwealths can coexist despite being in a state of nature with one another, yet he seems to argue that peace between them only lasts as long as each of them is well ordered and powerful enough to deter wars of aggression.
Sufficient public funds to maintain military capability, thereby, might to be a good indicator of a state's strength and unity. This is suggested by Hobbes's remark that "want of publick Treasure inviteth Neigbhour Kings to incorach."
Regardless of how commonwealths come to know each other's strength and unity, Hobbes's statements indicate that the lack of an obvious difference in power between them enhances their security and facilitates coexistence. This suggests that the artificial equality of Hobbesian states (which is due to the fact that different states have a similar number of obedient subjects) has a contrary effect to the natural equality of human beings. Rather than causing distrust and pre-emptive attacks, the rough equality of commonwealths is a disincentive to war.
IV. Prudence and Self-restraint in Warfare
It follows from what has been said that, unlike individuals in the natural condition, sovereigns are not compelled to wage war out of fear for their own survival. Rather, they seem to be able to maintain largely peaceful relations with their neighbours based on deterrence and mutual recognition of each other's power. Provided the condition of artificial equality is met, the potential losses for the sovereign would, as will be shown below, often outweigh the likely benefits of war.
Hobbes seems to presume that people normally only revert to violence when it appears beneficial. In Elements of Law and Leviathan, he considers the possibility that exceptionally strong passions inhibit the capacity to reason, which he calls madness. that "it were madness to invade such, whom conquering you cannot keep; and failing, should lose the means for ever after to attempt the same again." 75 As in the case of wars of gain, there are also alternative sources of glory that could substitute warfare. In Elements to Law, Hobbes notes that monarchs may instead distinguish themselves in other fields, such music or poetry. 76 In Leviathan, he likewise suggests that only some kings seek glory in new conquests, while others aim for sensual pleasures or excellence in some art. 77 Given these less risky alternatives, it seems that sovereigns would be well advised to avoid wars for glory.
V. Conclusion
This article has shown the dynamic relationship between the notions of nature and artifice in Hobbes's international political thought. Given that commonwealths are in a state of nature, they face a constant threat of wars of aggression, and ultimately have to rely on their own resources to defend themselves. Sovereigns, in particular, have to fear for their lives and liberty, as they are likely to be specifically targeted at war.
Furthermore, Hobbes suggests that rulers can only enjoy relative security as long as their states are well ordered and powerful enough to deter foreign invasions.
Despite this, sovereigns are in a better position than individuals in the state of nature. Even when states do engage in warfare, this does not necessarily have the same disastrous effects as the war of all against all in the natural condition. Hobbes argues that, in order to sustain their foreign conquests, invaders eventually need to reestablish a protection-obedience relationship. The reconciliation of former enemies is, thereby, facilitated by the artificiality of states, which allows for them to be decomposed and reassembled. Thus, Hobbes also denies that cultural differences, which might be regarded as 'natural,' constitute an insuperable obstacle to peace.
Ultimately, the artificial political unity that results from submission to an absolute sovereign is more important than any pre-existing identities.
These findings further elucidate the widely acknowledged differences between the international and interpersonal states of nature. Moreover, they help to explain why Hobbes does not provide something akin to a theory of international relations. 78 It seems that, in his view, foreign affairs can be reduced to a matter of either prudence or political philosophy. Usually the conduct of international relations will be subject to the judgment of sovereigns, who ought to govern well, and avoid unnecessary wars, for their own good. 79 In the extreme case of a successful foreign invasion, people are permitted to submit themselves to the victor, who ought to accept them as his subjects in order to acquire sovereignty by acquisition. In this event, international relations would simply be a matter of applying political philosophy. 79 One question that has not been addressed here is that of the relationship between the laws of nature, which dictate that human beings seek peace, and prudence.
